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THE ELUSIVENESS OF SELF-DEFENSE FOR
THE BLACK TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY
Shawn E. Fields*
INTRODUCTION
Ky Peterson, a Black transgender man from rural Georgia, had previously
been brutally raped while walking home.1 Mr. Peterson reported the incident to
the police, but they never opened an investigation;2 in fact, the police “could
barely be bothered to file [a] report.”3 As a result, Mr. Peterson began carrying
a firearm for personal protection.4
On October 28, 2011, Mr. Peterson was again attacked and raped.5 The
man—whose advances Mr. Peterson had rejected earlier that night—
approached Mr. Peterson from behind and struck him in the head, rendering
him unconscious.6 When Mr. Peterson awoke, the stranger was on top of him,
penetrating him while hurling transphobic insults at him.7 After a lengthy
struggle, Mr. Peterson reached for his handgun and killed the attacker.8 Mr. Peterson later reported the incident to the police and completed a rape kit, which
confirmed the brutal nature of his sexual assault.9 Nevertheless, police dismissed his claims of rape and self-defense, charging him with “armed robbery,
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See Sunnivie Brydum & Mitch Kellaway, This Black Trans Man Is in Prison for Killing
His Rapist, ADVOCATE (Apr. 8, 2015, 11:15 AM), https://www.advocate.com/politics/transge
nder/2015/04/08/black-trans-man-prison-killing-his-rapist [https://perma.cc/S7H4-ABQP];
see also Samone Ijoma, False Promises of Protection: Black Women, Trans People & the
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RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 255, 268 (2018).
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aggravated assault, malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and three
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.”10
Mr. Peterson’s actions arguably fell within the traditional common law definition of self-defense.11 But they clearly fell within Georgia’s expansive Stand
Your Ground laws, providing among the broadest scope of self-defense protection for the use of lethal force in public of any state in the country.12 Mr. Peterson’s defense lawyer did not even assert a Stand Your Ground defense on his
behalf, claiming that his race and gender identity would make such a defense
useless before a rural Georgia jury.13 While Mr. Peterson asserted self-defense,
he was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison.14
This story poignantly illustrates the systemic under-enforcement and overenforcement of the Black transgender community by law enforcement.
Transgender people of color, particularly Black transgender individuals, “experience violence at a disproportionate rate” in the United States.15 Black
transgender men and women are more likely than their White transgender
counterparts—and many times more likely than the general population—to
“experience virtually every category of violence, including transphobic family
violence, violence in schools and places of public accommodation, and police
and prison violence.”16 Black transgender individuals face among the highest
domestic violence rates in the country.17 And murders of Black transgender individuals have risen dramatically in recent years and are almost certainly underreported.18

10

Id.
See Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws, 67 U.
MIA. L. REV. 827, 832–33 (2013) (describing the difference between Stand Your Ground legislation and traditional self-defense doctrine, which requires a reasonable belief of imminent
deadly force and a proportional use of force to repel that danger).
12
See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3–23.1 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.); see also
Stand Your Ground, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/
guns-in-public/stand-your-ground-laws [https://perma.cc/55U2-PR8C] (summarizing the
scope of Stand Your Ground laws across the country).
13
Ijoma, supra note 1, at 269 (“His lawyer did not even present Peterson with a Stand-YourGround defense as an option because he knew such a defense would likely be unsuccessful
given Peterson’s racial and gender identity.”); see also CAROLINE E. LIGHT, STAND YOUR
GROUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S LOVE AFFAIR WITH LETHAL SELF-DEFENSE 183 (2017).
14
Ijoma, supra note 1, at 269.
15
See Carrie L. Buist, LGBTQ Rights in the Fields of Criminal Law and Law Enforcement,
54 U. RICH. L. REV. 877, 897–98 (2020) (observing that Black transgender individuals “are
the victims of especially brutal murders in [America]”).
16
Gabriel Arkles, Gun Control, Mental Illness, and Black Trans and Lesbian Survival, 42
SW. L. REV. 855, 860 (2013).
17
See Leonore F. Carpenter & R. Barrett Marshall, Walking While Trans: Profiling of
Transgender Women by Law Enforcement, and the Problem of Proof, 24 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 5, 9 (2018); see also Buist, supra note 15, at 897.
18
Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 9, 29 n.119.
11

21 NEV. L.J. 975

Spring 2021] SELF-DEFENSE FOR THE BLACK TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY

977

But as illustrated in Mr. Peterson’s case, police intervention and protection
for this community remain sorely lacking. Years of anecdotal evidence and recent alarming empirical data show a disturbing ambivalence (or worse) from
police when responding to reports of violence by Black trans victims.19
“Transgender victims of domestic violence report that calling the police frequently results in the transgender victim being arrested, violence from the police, or a total failure to respond to the situation.”20 Black transgender women
regularly report police failing to take reports of violence seriously, because the
victim is “really a man.”21 Indeed, transgender victims of all backgrounds are
often as likely to be harassed or sexually abused by police when reporting a
crime as they are to have their claims treated seriously and investigated.22
Given this systemic lack of protection from the criminal legal system,
Black transgender individuals like Mr. Peterson increasingly must rely on selfprotective measures to repel the disproportionate rates of violence to which
they are subjected. But exercising lawful self-defense exposes the Black
transgender community to police over-enforcement of their lawful actions. In
this sense, the community feels the dual effects of historic criminalization of
the Black community and the transgender community. The centuries’ long
over-criminalization and over-enforcement of the Black community by police
is well-documented, including in the availability (or lack thereof) of selfdefense to Black individuals lawfully repelling a violent attack.23 Rather than
providing an opportunity for expanded self-defense protection, Stand Your
Ground laws have only reinforced the racially disproportionate impact of selfdefense assertions in criminal adjudications.24

19

See AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: STONEWALLED: POLICE ABUSE AND
MISCONDUCT AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN THE U.S. 72,
125–26 (2005).
20
Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17 (“These experiences make transgender violence victims believe that the police offer very little safety and, in fact, support a belief that they may
be more dangerous than perpetrators of violence such as domestic abusers.”).
21
See id.; see also Kae Greenberg, Still Hidden in the Closet: Trans Women and Domestic
Violence, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 198, 231–32 (2012).
22
Greenberg, supra note 21, at 230–31, 234.
23
See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not
yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1555, 1589 (2013) [hereinafter Lee, Making
Race Salient] (describing the “especially problematic” influence racial bias has on jurors assessing “claims of self-defense” by Black defendants); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and
Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367,
374 (1996) (“[S]tereotyping can influence decisionmaking [sic] in self-defense cases.”); Addie C. Rolnick, Defending White Space, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1639, 1673–74 (2019) (critiquing the “facially race-neutral” laws of self-defense that implicitly incorporate racial fear into
the assessment of “reasonableness”).
24
A.B.A., NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS: FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 12–13 (2015); The Inherent Danger of Stand Your Ground Laws,
EVERYTOWN (Feb. 8, 2019) (citing JOHN K. ROMAN, RACE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE, AND
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Police have also singled out and overly scrutinized the lawful actions of the
transgender community, from enforcing so-called “impersonation or masquerade laws”25 and issuing disturbing the peace citations for gender nonconforming dress,26 to baselessly arresting individuals for prostitution based on transphobic assumptions about sexual behavior.27 Increasingly, as Ky Peterson,
CeCe McDonald,28 and other Black transgender victims of violence have
learned, lawfully protecting oneself from violent physical assault has merely
provided police another opportunity to scrutinize, over-enforce, and overcriminalize a vulnerable and marginalized community.
This Essay highlights the need for, and elusiveness of, self-defense as a viable affirmative defense for the Black transgender community and the central
role law enforcement plays in this narrative. Police protection is needed but
largely remains unavailable to this disproportionately victimized community,
making self-defense a necessary last resort. But police over-enforcement and
criminalization of this community renders self-defense an elusive tool of legal
protection, especially when other institutional actors—prosecutors, judges, and
juries—may harbor many of the same pernicious prejudices infecting precincts
across the country.
Recent events in Brunswick, Georgia, three hours from Ky Peterson’s rape
and self-defensive actions, highlight the urgent need to confront this issue.29 InSTAND YOUR GROUND LAWS: ANALYSIS OF FBI SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORT DATA 7
tbl.2 (2013)), https://everytownresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2020/07/inherent-dan
ger-stand-ground-laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/7S84-G8YY] (“When white shooters kill black
victims, the resulting homicides are deemed justifiable 11 times more frequently than when
the shooter is Black and the victim is white.”).
25
Buist, supra note 15, at 885–86 (summarizing a long history of “anti-cross-dressing”
laws).
26
Gabriel Arkles, Correcting Race and Gender: Prison Regulation of Social Hierarchy
Through Dress, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 859, 882 (2012) (“In 2011, Oklahoma police arrested a
Black trans woman for disorderly conduct because she wore high heels and carried a purse in
a public park.”); see Galbreath v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV-11-1336-HE, 2012 WL
255734, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 27, 2012) (providing the arresting officer’s account of the
reasons for the arrest).
27
See Buist, supra note 15, at 886 (recounting the story of Monica Jones, a Black trans
woman who was arrested in 2014 in Phoenix, Arizona on suspicion of prostitution based in
part on her appearance and transgender identity).
28
See Sabrina Rubin Erdely, The Transgender Crucible, ROLLING STONE (July 30, 2014,
2:00 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/the-transgender-crucible-1140
95 [https://perma.cc/UVR5-4Y35] (describing the case of a homeless transgender woman
who was attacked by a group of men hurling racist and transphobic insults, defended herself
with a glass bottle, stabbed and killed an attacker with a visible swastika tattoo, and was
charged with second degree murder before pleading guilty to manslaughter).
29
Charles M. Blow, The Killing of Ahmaud Arbery, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/opinion/ahmaud-arbery-killing.html [https://perma.cc/
H7AH-6W35] (describing the case of Ahmaud Arbery, an unarmed black man chased and
shot dead by two White men during a botched “citizen’s arrest” based solely on their mistaken assumption that he was an armed robbery suspect).
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deed, when a District Attorney can claim that two White men chasing and gunning down an unarmed Black man in broad daylight as part of a “citizen’s arrest” was a justifiable act of self-defense, one cannot help but wonder why Ky
Peterson sits in a Georgia prison today.30
I.

THE NEED FOR SELF-PROTECTION

This Essay posits a greater need among the Black transgender population
to employ self-defense as a survival strategy for two primary reasons. First,
rates of violence—including sexual violence, intimate partner violence, and
murder—are far higher for this population than the national average. Second,
Black transgender victims of violence cannot reliably depend on law enforcement for protection from their perpetrators. These victims who report their
crimes face ambivalence, claims of dishonesty, discrimination, and violence
from the very police charged with protecting them. This dual reality that Black
transgender individuals are both more likely to be violently assaulted and less
likely to be protected by police often makes self-defense the last available option.
A. Rates of Violence
Reliable data on transgender populations remains scarce for a variety of
reasons,31 but government agencies and human rights organizations uniformly
report that the transgender community faces disproportionate rates of violence
in the United States.32 Much of this violence involves transphobic harassment
regarding gender identity and gender-based sexual violence. The National Resource Center on Domestic Violence (NRCDV) reported that, according to a
2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, 46 percent of respondents were “verbally harassed in the past year because of being transgender,” 9 percent “were physical30

Id. (quoting two prosecutors who recused themselves from the case after making statements that the killing was justified, alternatively because “[a] private person may arrest an
offender if the offense is committed in his presence or within his immediate knowledge,”
and that “[g]iven the fact that Arbery initiated the fight, at the point Arbery grabbed the
shotgun, under Georgia law, McMichael was allowed to use deadly force to protect himself”). Video footage later released of the incident refutes this claim. Id.
31
See FORGE, TRANSGENDER RATES OF VIOLENCE (2012), https://forge-forward.org/resourc
e/rates-of-violence [https://perma.cc/QDP5-UQD9].
32
See Nat’l Res. Ctr. on Domestic Violence, Violence Against Trans and Non-Binary People, https://vawnet.org/sc/serving-trans-and-non-binary-survivors-domestic-and-sexual-viole
nce/violence-against-trans-and [https://perma.cc/GUT9-WBEU]; FORGE, supra note 31;
Off. for Victims of Crime, Responding to Transgender Victims of Sexual Assault: The Numbers (June 2014), https://ovc.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh226/files/pubs/forge/sexual_number
s.html [https://perma.cc/UNU3-PSQ3]; see also Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 7
(“[T]ransgender women are at exceptionally high risk of experiencing violence and harassment, which is meted out by both private and state actors, and both in private and institutional spaces.”).
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ly attacked . . . because of being transgender,” 47 percent had been the victim
of a sexual assault, and 54 percent had experienced “intimate partner violence.”33 These rates of violence are double, and in some cases triple, the commonly reported rates of sexual violence and intimate partner abuse.34 Moreover,
both NRCDV and the federal government’s Office for Victims of Crime report
that rates of violence in the transgender community are even higher for
transgender communities of color, especially Black transgender individuals.35
Scholars examining this data have explored the multilayered discrimination
facing this intersectional group. Particularly for victims of intimate partner violence (IPV), “[s]tatistics show that Black women suffer from intimate partner
violence at a higher rate than white women . . . [and] that trans people are at an
increased risk for intimate partner violence” within that group.36 This disproportionate impact is reflected in lethal IPV cases as well:
[m]ore than [50] percent of female homicide victims between the ages of eighteen and forty-four are killed by an intimate partner, and Black women are killed
at a rate almost three times that of white women. [Within that group,]
[t]ransgender persons are also at an increased risk for intimate partner violence
because of transphobia within their intimate relationships.37

Some scholars have explained that these increased rates of IPV and sexual violence reflect a desire to control and enforce gender norms within relationships38
and vulnerability for transgender people who cannot conform to these gender
stereotypes.39
There certainly exists room at the margins to quibble with the accuracy of
these quoted statistics because little consistent demographic data has been col-

33

Nat’l Res. Ctr. on Domestic Violence, supra note 32.
Off. for Victims of Crime, supra note 32; see also Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17
(nothing that Black transgender women “experience domestic violence at extraordinary
rates”).
35
Off. for Victims of Crime, supra note 32; see also TAYLOR N.T. BROWN & JODY L.
HERMAN, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ABUSE AMONG LGBT PEOPLE: A
REVIEW OF EXISTING RESEARCH 3, 5, 14 (2015); Buist, supra note 15, at 877 (“[T]he
transgender community . . . faces unheard of rates of violence, especially transgender women
of color. Transgender women of color are murdered in the United States at rates that continue to increase.”); Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17 (“Every year in recent history has
seen the murder of scores of transgender women of color, most notably Black transgender
women.”).
36
Ijoma, supra note 1, at 255–56; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL,
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 39
(2011) (finding that “rape, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner” is more
prevalent among Black women than white women).
37
Ijoma, supra note 1, at 260 (footnote omitted); see also Leigh Goodmark, Transgender
People, Intimate Partner Abuse, and the Legal System, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 51, 91–
93 (2013).
38
Goodmark, supra note 37, at 94.
39
Id.
34
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lected about this population.40 But legal observers and human rights groups
agree that these shocking statistics are almost certainly underreported.41
B. Police (Non)responsiveness
Given the reality that Black transgender individuals face disproportionate
rates of violence, “one would reasonably conclude that law enforcement ought
to be doing everything in their power to protect transgender women [and men]
from violence at the hands of private actors. However, . . . the converse appears
to be true.”42 Disturbing anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests police respond to transgender victims with a mixture of ambivalence, distrust, transphobic discrimination, and violence.
Much of this troubling official response appears linked to regressive attitudes about gender normativity. For example, IPV “is just as prevalent if not
more prevalent in same-sex relationships, yet the enforcement of criminal law
regarding arrests of such offenders is [more] limited” than in opposite-sex relationships.43 One explanation proffered by scholars and police themselves is that
“officers are more likely to take heterosexual IPV more seriously and see
straight male offenders as the more serious perpetrators,” in part because of beliefs about the inherent fragility of women in opposite-sex relationships.44
More broadly, transgender victims of crime “report a high frequency of
negative interactions with law enforcement,” both when reporting criminal ac40

The transgender community, and the broader LGBTQ+ community, has fought for years
even to be officially counted by government bureaus. See Alex Ronan, How Big Is the
Transgender Population?, CUT (June 11, 2015), https://www.thecut.com/2015/06/how-bigis-the-transgender-population.html [https://perma.cc/2XGC-R6RL] (“There’s no national
data on the size of the transgender population because official record collectors like the
United States Census Bureau don’t ask about gender identity.”); Mary Emily O’Hara,
LGBTQ Americans Won’t Be Counted in 2020 U.S. Census After All, NBC NEWS (Mar. 29,
2017, 10:27 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/lgbtq-americans-won-t-be-cou
nted-2020-u-s-census-n739911 [https://perma.cc/Z5MS-YVTC]; ANDREW R. FLORES ET AL.,
HOW MANY ADULTS IDENTIFY AS TRANSGENDER IN THE UNITED STATES? 2 (2016),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/trans-adults-united-states [https://perma.cc
/YX86-A48D] (“Population-based surveys . . . rarely ask questions to identify transgender
people . . . .”).
41
A National Epidemic: Fatal Anti-Transgender Violence in the United States in 2019,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Nov. 2019), https://www.hrc.org/resources/a-national-epidemic-fatalanti-trans-violence-in-the-united-states-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/84JD-UH6N] (explaining
that rates of violence against the transgender community “very likely undercount the number
of transgender and gender non-conforming people who [are] killed in the United
States . . . often because authorities, journalists and/or family members refuse to
acknowledge [the victim’s] gender correctly”).
42
Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 9, 12; see also AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 19, at
65, 71.
43
Buist, supra note 15, at 883; ADAM M. MESSINGER, LGBTQ INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE: LESSONS FOR POLICY, PRACTICE, AND RESEARCH 5 (2017).
44
Buist, supra note 15, at 884.
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tivity and when being approached by police.45 Nearly one-third of all
transgender victim respondents report “being treated in a generally disrespectful way by police,” while 47 percent of Black transgender victims report being
“disrespected by police.”46
Much of this reported disrespect takes the form of disbelieving or discrediting transgender victim stories of violence. While victims of sexual violence and
IPV across the board—particularly victims identifying as female—suffer from
the “credibility discount” by an ambivalent and skeptical criminal legal system,47 transgender violence victims often confront the unique false stereotype
that they are inherently “deceitful.”48 For decades, many states expressly mandated binary gender conformity under threat of punishment, criminalizing the
“impersonation” of a gender not in conformance with one’s assigned birth
sex.49 “These [anti-cross dressing] or masquerade laws have contributed to the
lie that queer folks, . . . especially transgender folks, are deceptive by nature
and not to be trusted, which in turn exacerbates the distrust between law enforcement and the queer community.”50
This mutual distrust is reflected not only in police skepticism of
transgender victims but in “[l]aw enforcement’s pervasive profiling of
transgender women, particularly those of color, as sex workers.”51 Transgender
women “overwhelmingly report [this] very specific problem,” noting that police subject them to “aggressive, often abusive, policing practices based upon
45

Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 13; see also Buist, supra note 15, at 886; ERIN
FITZGERALD ET AL., MEANINGFUL WORK: TRANSGENDER EXPERIENCES IN THE SEX TRADE 5
(2015).
46
Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 13.
47
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount,
166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 57 (2017) (describing the “credibility discount,” that is, “the legal rules
that once formally embedded skepticism of rape complaints, and . . . [the] contemporary outlet for this skepticism in police and prosecutorial responses to sexual violence”).
48
Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal
Conceptualization of Gender That Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 253, 263 (2005) (“[T]he sex-gender distinction plays into a belief that
transgender people are deceitful, a belief that can cost transgender people their lives.”); Cynthia Lee & Peter Kwan, The Trans Panic Defense: Masculinity, Heteronormativity, and the
Murder of Transgender Women, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 77, 114 (2014) (explaining that the trans
panic defense rests on the premise that a transgender woman is being deceitful if she does
not disclose her biological sex); Cynthia Lee, The Trans Panic Defense Revisited, 57 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1411, 1444 (2020) (same).
49
See Buist, supra note 15, at 885; Lauren Bishop, Gender and Sex Designations for Identification Purposes: A Discussion on Inclusive Documentation for a Less Assimilationist Society, 30 WIS. J.L., GENDER & SOC’Y 131, 150 (2015) (“[P]ast sumptuary laws . . . gave police
the authority to arrest anyone found ‘impersonating another gender’ by not wearing ‘gender
appropriate clothing.’ ”).
50
Buist, supra note 15, at 885–86 (“Police have long-viewed the queer community not as a
group in need of understanding and support, but in need of surveillance and punishment.”).
51
Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 5–6 (footnote omitted); see FITZGERALD ET AL.,
supra note 45, at 17.
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law enforcement’s perception that they are universally and perpetually engaged
in sex work.”52 “This phenomenon,” wherein officers “stop, harass, and demand identification from transgender women,” command that they disperse,
and “arrest them for low-level [quality of life] offenses tied to suspicions of
prostitution . . . is sufficiently widespread that the transgender community has
given it the colloquial label ‘walking while trans.’ ”53 This specific form of police harassment also disproportionately affects the Black transgender community, with 38 percent of these individuals reporting profile-based harassment,
compared with 22 percent of all transgender individuals.54
Many vaguely worded local ordinances criminalizing the “manifestation”
of an intent to engage in prostitution, which often turn on subjective factors
such as how often a person stops and engages passersby in conversation, only
exacerbate this profiling.55 As Monica Jones, a Black transgender student at Arizona State University learned, “[t]he difference between ‘innocent’ and ‘criminal’ behavior often comes down to how a person looks.”56 Jones reported being repeatedly harassed by police and suspected of solicitation on four
occasions, including while “walking to the grocery store” and “visiting with a
friend on the sidewalk,” before finally being arrested for manifesting an intent
to engage in prostitution in May 2014.57 Despite neither engaging in nor harboring any intent to engage in sex work,58 Jones suffered the dual discrimination of being suspected of criminal activity because of her race59 and being suspected of “deceitful” and “hypersexual”60 conduct because of her transgender
identity.
C. Self-Defense as a Last Resort
Police skepticism, harassment, and profiling of Black transgender individuals “significantly erodes the level of trust and comfort” this population feels
“with respect to law enforcement,” which in turn dramatically suppresses crime
reporting among this group.61 This distrust also makes self-help measures, in52

Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 13–14.
Id. at 6.
54
Id. at 13.
55
Chase Strangio, Arrested for Walking While Trans: An Interview with Monica Jones,
ACLU CRIM. L. REFORM BLOG (Apr. 2, 2014, 11:19 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/crimina
l-law-reform/arrested-walking-while-trans-interview-monica-jones [https://perma.cc/N7EU7UUA].
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
See id.
59
Id.
60
See Ijoma, supra note 1, at 273, 283.
61
Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 16; see also JAMIE M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L GAY
& LESBIAN TASK FORCE & NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY
TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 162 (2011)
53
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cluding violent self-defense, a more attractive option for this vulnerable intersectional population.62
But this calculation to take self-help measures is driven by more than preference. It is one of survival. Sexual violence and harassment against
transgender women, especially Black transgender women, “is especially pervasive in the endemically violent and highly gender-segregated institutions that
make up the American criminal justice system.”63 When Black transgender victims interact with law enforcement, either voluntarily or involuntarily, they run
the very real risk that they will be profiled, arrested and charged, and placed in
a prison system where they disproportionately “suffer unusually brutal hardships.”64 These binary, gender-segregated prisons make transgender women in
particular extraordinarily vulnerable to attacks by men incarcerated in the same
facility. In one recent case, a transgender woman was arrested “regarding
something minor. Due to my gender being marked male, I was put in with the
men. Within [fifteen] minutes, I was raped by [three] different men.”65
In short, the threat of police harassment, coupled with the threat of sexual
violence in prison, compels many Black transgender victims to believe that police “may be more dangerous than perpetrators of violence.”66 As a result, these
victims may choose to remain with abusers rather than report them to the police, and when necessary, protect themselves through self-defense as the last
and only resort.
II. THE ELUSIVENESS OF SELF-DEFENSE
Both the over-victimization of Black transgender individuals by private actors and the under-protection of these individuals by law enforcement compel a
greater need for self-help measures. As the experiences of Ky Peterson and
CeCe McDonald illustrate, sometimes these necessary self-help measures in(“Police harassment and assault had an apparent deterrent effect on respondents’ willingness
to seek out help from law enforcement.”).
62
See Buist, supra note 15, at 878, 885 (“[Q]ueer criminology studies the persistent distrust
that the LGBTQ+ community has of police . . . . [E]xisting studies . . . continue to reveal
queer folks’ distrust of police and in turn polices’ distrust of queer folks.”).
63
Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 7; see also id. at 10 n.21 (“[T]ransgender inmates
in American prisons who have not undergone sex reassignment surgery ‘are generally classified according to their birth sex for purposes of prison housing, regardless of how long they
may have lived as a member of the other gender . . . .’ ” (quoting Chapter Three: Classification and Housing of Transgender Inmates in American Prisons, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1746,
1748 (2014))).
64
Id. at 7.
65
Id. at 11 (citing GRANT ET AL., supra note 61, at 168).
66
Id. at 9; see also Ijoma, supra note 1, at 286 (“[P]olice arrests of transgender people who
report intimate partner violence and sexual assault are frequent.”); ANDREA J. RITCHIE,
INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR 191
(2017) (“Advocates also told us that, where domestic violence against transgender women is
concerned, officers often laugh, or say, ‘You’re a man, too. You can handle yourself . . . .’ ”).
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volve lethal self-defense. At common law, states recognized as legitimate—
indeed, justified—such killing in self-defense when reasonably necessary to repel an imminent, proportional attack. More recently, states have codified broad
expansions of this affirmative defense and relaxed its narrow application, authorizing citizens to “stand their ground” and eliminating the duty to retreat
from conflict even where it is possible to do so.
This expansion should be good news to Black transgender victims forced
to defend themselves. Unfortunately, many of the same stereotypes corroding
transgender victims’ interactions with law enforcement similarly infect the
prosecutors, judges, and juries assessing the validity of their self-defense
claims. The end result is a system that both refuses to protect this vulnerable
population from private violence and then punishes them for lawfully exercising their right to protect themselves.
A. Common Law Self-Defense
The intentional killing of another person is regarded as the most morally
blameworthy, and thus most severely punished, act in criminal law.67 As a result, “[t]he legal principles that permit the use of deadly force in self-defense
present a very limited exception to the rule that killing is illegal.”68 Affirmative
self-defense provides a legal justification to homicide, communicating society’s
moral judgment that the violent act itself was not just “understandable” but actually “desirable.”69
Not surprisingly, this legal justification to kill has traditionally been narrowly defined and applied. At common law, a person could only use force in
self-defense if she honestly and reasonably believed that she was in imminent
danger, force was necessary to avoid the danger, and the force used was proportional to the threat.70 “These four elements—imminence of threat, necessity,

67

State v. Brown, 931 P.2d 69, 72 (N.M. 1996) (“First-degree murder is reserved for the
most blameworthy or ‘the most heinous and reprehensible’ class of homicides . . . .” (quoting
State v. Garcia, 837 P.2d 862, 865 (N.M. 1992))); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
796–97 (1982) (holding that imposing the death penalty for felony murder violates the
Eighth Amendment when the defendant does not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill the victim); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008) (holding that imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child violates the Eighth Amendment); Stephanie N. O’Banion, Dying
in Detention: Are Life Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile Non-Homicide Offenders Always Unconstitutionally Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment?, 38
U. DAYTON L. REV. 449, 463 (“[I]t is the culpability of the offender . . . that causes society to
consider a homicide crime more morally blameworthy than all other crimes.”).
68
Rolnick, supra note 23, at 1658.
69
Id.
70
2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 127 (15th ed. 2018) (a person may kill in self-defense if
“he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or suffering great
bodily harm”).
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proportionality, and reasonableness—form the legal bounds of traditional selfdefense doctrine.”71
Two of these elements—necessity and reasonableness—require brief further discussion for purposes of this Essay. Necessity requires that the use of
force be the only available option; if a safe retreat or de-escalation is available,
force may not be used.72 The one exception to that requirement exists in the
home, where in “defense of habitation” a person need not retreat to use force to
defend oneself.73 This “castle doctrine” has existed in English common law for
hundreds of years and until recently was strictly confined to the home.74 However, as discussed below, state legislatures have enacted a series of laws increasingly allowing the use of force in public places even when a safe retreat
option exists. These so-called “Stand Your Ground” laws have extended the
castle doctrine to virtually any private or public space in society.75
As for reasonableness, the adjudication of this element presents challenging problems fraught not only with the inherent subjectivity of the shooter’s
mental state but with larger societal issues related to race, gender, age, and other demographic markers. “Reasonableness” has long been viewed from the perspective of the reasonable White man in American law and culture, and what is
collectively viewed as “reasonable” may very well have implicit or explicit racist, sexist, and gender normative contours, both for the shooter and for the “victim.”76 Many scholars have critiqued this reasonableness requirement as inherently infected with society’s collective implicit bias that it is reasonable to
assess dark-skinned individuals as more threatening and to act accordingly in
self-defensive response.77 But as discussed below, this bias works in reverse.
71

Rolnick, supra note 23, at 1659.
See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 134–36 (1998).
73
See State v. Kuhns, 817 S.E.2d 828, 830 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (“ ‘[A] man’s house, however humble, is his castle, and his castle he is entitled to protect against invasion[.]’ . . .
Commonly known as the ‘castle doctrine,’ the defense of habitation is ‘based on the theory
that if a person is bound to become a fugitive from her own home, there would be no refuge
for her anywhere in the world.’ ” (citations omitted) (first quoting State v. Gray, 77 S.E. 833,
835 (1913); then quoting State v. Stevenson, 344 S.E.2d 334, 335 (1986))).
74
Id.; see Conner v. State, 361 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (“The castle doctrine is of ancient origin . . . .”).
75
See infra Section II.B.
76
See Lee, Making Race Salient, supra note 23, at 1584–85 (observing that implicit bias
from the dominant White majority affects a jury’s reasonableness calculus: “If most individuals would be more likely to ‘see’ a weapon in the hands of an unarmed Black person than in
the hands of an unarmed White person . . . then jurors in self-defense cases may also be more
likely to find that an individual who says he shot an unarmed Black person in selfdefense . . . acted reasonably, even if he was mistaken.”).
77
L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98
IOWA L. REV. 293, 310 (2012) (“Blacks serve as our mental prototype (i.e., stereotype) for
the violent street criminal.”); id. at 314 (“When the person being judged fits a criminal stereotype, the suspicion heuristic can cause the actor more easily to believe honestly—but mistakenly—that the person poses a threat and that deadly force is necessary . . . .”).
72
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The same stereotype mythologizing racial minorities as inherently violent also
calls into question the “reasonableness” of violent self-defensive actions taken
by those same minorities, even if otherwise necessary and lawful.
B. Stand Your Ground
In the last two decades, states have expanded the centuries-old “core” selfdefense doctrine through a series of legislative enactments collectively referred
to as “Stand Your Ground” laws.78 These laws remove any duty to retreat when
a person feels threatened and permit the use of deadly force in public if the person reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.79
Stand Your Ground laws upend traditional self-defense doctrine in numerous ways. Under traditional self-defense law, a person can use force to defend
themselves anywhere, but when they are outside their home they cannot use
force likely to kill or seriously injure someone if there is a safe way to avoid
doing so.80 This traditional law respects both a person’s right to self-defense
and the sanctity of human life by requiring someone to avoid taking a life if a
clear and safe alternative exists.81
Conversely, the well-established castle doctrine exception allows a person
inside their home to defend themselves with force even if they could have safely walked away.82 Stand Your Ground laws remove the duty to retreat by allowing people to shoot to kill in public even if a clear and safe alternative exists. At
least thirty-five jurisdictions have some version of Stand Your Ground, either
through legislative enactment or judicial order, while another three have expanded the castle doctrine.83
In addition to expanding the castle doctrine to apply broadly anywhere in
public, Stand Your Ground laws significantly relax the requirements of imminence and proportionality, necessarily broadening what the law will recognize
as a justified homicide. Under traditional self-defense law, “a defendant must
demonstrate that the threatened harm to which he is reacting is imminent,” un78

See Lave, supra note 11.
See Aya Gruber, Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your
Ground, 68 U. MIA. L. REV. 961, 962 (2014).
80
See Lave, supra note 11 (analyzing the difference between “Stand Your Ground [and] a
more traditional self-defense law”); Cynthia V. Ward, “Stand Your Ground” and SelfDefense, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 89, 93–100 (2015) (discussing the historical and legal development of the traditional self-defense rule in criminal law).
81
See Stand Your Ground, supra note 12.
82
Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86
MARQ. L. REV. 653, 667 (2003) (“In the case of defense of habitation, the Castle Doctrine
allows the resident to stand ground and use deadly force against the intruder to protect the
sanctity of the home from the attempted atrocious felony because the duty to retreat would
be incompatible with the goal of preventing the commission of the felony.”).
83
Stand Your Ground, supra note 12.
79
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less the defendant is confronted with an intruder in his own home.84 But by expanding this “defense of habitation” rule to all public spaces, Stand Your
Ground laws create “a presumption of imminent threat when an intruder tries to
break into an unoccupied building, car, or a boat.”85 Some states do not even
require the intruder to be actively intruding, but only near the structure, stretching the meaning of the word “imminent” to strain credulity.86
A growing chorus of scholars and activists harshly criticize Stand Your
Ground laws, pointing to damning empirical evidence significantly correlating
the laws with increased violent crime.87 It is indisputable that these laws “are
associated with higher rates of homicides.”88 A 2012 study by researchers at
Texas A&M found that Stand Your Ground jurisdictions saw a significant increase in homicide rates, with an average of more than 600 additional homicides per year.89
Moreover, Stand Your Ground laws have a clear disproportionate impact
on communities of color.90 In advocating for the repeal of Stand Your Ground
laws, the advocacy group Everytown for Gun Safety noted that “[w]hen white
shooters kill Black victims, the resulting homicides are deemed justifiable
[eleven] times more frequently than when the shooter is Black and the victim is
white.”91 Therefore, the death of a minority individual in a Stand Your Ground
case is “half as likely to lead to a conviction, compared to cases with white victims.”92 Similarly, the American Bar Association has highlighted that Stand
Your Ground laws exacerbate existing racial tensions and “perpetuate[] a foolish bravado of those who feel a bold security when they have a gun in their
hand, and it exonerates an arrogance and/or ignorance.”93
Researchers have also shown that implicit bias and cultural misperceptions
of racial minorities as “more violent” or “more aggressive” exacerbate the disproportionate impact of Stand Your Ground laws.94 Many scholars have noted
the importance of race and racial stereotypes as public policy considerations
when considering whether to repeal Stand Your Ground laws, explaining that
84

Rolnick, supra note 23, at 1679, 1680.
Id. at 1681.
86
Id. at 1681, 1685, 1688, 1690.
87
See, e.g., Lave, supra note 11, at 856; Gruber, supra note 79, at 964; Shawn E. Fields,
Weaponized Racial Fear, 93 TUL. L. REV. 931, 987 (2019) (criticizing Stand Your Ground
laws as a form of state sanction for racially fearful “vigilantes” to police the color line in
public).
88
A.B.A., supra note 24, at 6, 11–14 (2015) (citing data from four nationwide surveys).
89
Id. at 11.
90
Id. at 24–26.
91
The Inherent Danger of Stand Your Ground Laws, supra, note 24.
92
Id.
93
A.B.A., supra note 24, at 24 (quoting Leonard Leach, Reverend, Mt. Hebron Missionary
Baptist Church).
94
Id.
85
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cross-racial and cross-cultural fears and perceptions can unfairly impact the
reasonableness prong in a justifiable homicide analysis.95
These critics focus primarily on the detrimental impacts Stand Your
Ground laws have on Black people and other persons of color as unfair targets
of lethal violence from armed vigilantes.96 As one attorney representing the
family of a Black victim of a purported Stand Your Ground homicide observed,
“minority communities are deathly afraid that Stand Your Ground law sits sideby-side with racial profiling; the ticket to vigilante justice.”97 But these expanded legal protections for self-defense measures, troubling as they are, should in
theory at least provide a more accessible avenue to the type of legal sanction
vulnerable groups like the Black transgender community need. In fact, conservative lobbying groups like the National Rifle Association (NRA) and
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) made this argument when
first proposing model Stand Your Ground legislation.98 “According to the
NRA, this type of legislation empowers innocent victims who have appealed to
the court system for help, while recognizing that the process for approving an
application for a gun permit may take too long for some victims.”99
C. Structural Barriers to Self-Defense Protection
Rather than providing greater protections for vulnerable victims, the protection of Stand Your Ground laws is unevenly available for minority victim
populations, resulting in “a disparate impact on Black women and trans people
of color.”100 Whether under traditional or expanded self-defense doctrine, persistent biases in the criminal legal system about what makes a person a “victim” virtually foreclose affirmative self-defense for the Black transgender
community. These pernicious biases include racist tropes about the inherent
criminality of Black people, the transphobic beliefs about the community’s
purported deceitfulness and hypersexuality, and this intersectional group’s inability to claim the discredited mantle of the “perfect victim.”
1. Racist Tropes
Scholars and historians have convincingly demonstrated that the racial
apartheid defining much of this nation’s history was supported by racist fear95

See id.
See, e.g., Fields, supra note 87, at 985, 988.
97
A.B.A., supra note 24, at 24.
98
Ijoma, supra note 1, at 256–57, 263 (“When the first version of a Stand-Your-Ground law
was proposed in Florida, the NRA argued that laws expanding self-defense were designed to
protect women . . . advocating for gun ownership as a solution to intimate partner violence
(‘IVP’) and other various forms of gendered violence.”).
99
Id. at 258.
100
Id. at 255, 288; see also Fields, supra note 87, at 988; Lave, supra note 11, at 843.
96
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mongering warning White America about the inherent criminality and violent
propensities of Black people, particularly Black men.101 Myths of the “black
bogeyman”102 have endured for centuries and taken many forms—from the “rebellious Negro,”103 to the “black brute” rapist,104 to the “super predator.”105
These racist tropes of a Black criminal subclass are now so ingrained in the fabric of American society that science long ago confirmed the existence of a pervasive, unconscious, and largely automatic bias against dark-skinned individuals as more hostile, criminal, and prone to violence.106 These biases infect
nearly everyone.107
101

Fran Lisa Buntman, Race, Reputation, and the Supreme Court: Valuing Blackness and
Whiteness, 56 U. MIA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001) (“In the United States, being black . . . has long
been seen as a sign of criminality, or at least criminal propensity.”); Paul Finkelman, The
Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2063, 2070, 2072, 2077, 2090–91, 2093 (1993) (tracing the
history of “blackness” as synonymous with crime to early court decisions justifying slavery
because of the inherent criminality of black men).
102
Laura T. Fishman, The Black Bogeyman and White Self-Righteousness, in IMAGES OF
COLOR, IMAGES OF CRIME 109, 113 (1998).
103
Bryan Adamson, “Thugs,” “Crooks,” and “Rebellious Negroes”: Racist and Racialized
Media Coverage of Michael Brown and the Ferguson Demonstrations, 32 HARV. J. ON
RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 189, 226–27 (2016) (connecting the centuries-old “rebellious Negro
trope” to current coverage of unarmed black men killed by police officers).
104
R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 859–60 (2004) (describing the stereotype of “the black beast, a violent
brute with an unusually powerful sexual appetite for white women who was completely devoid of humanity”); Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Racial Character Evidence in Police Killing
Cases, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 369, 408 (2018) (“The ‘black brute’ stereotype may be one of the
most enduring in this nation’s history and persists even today.” (quoting Ryan P. Alford, Appellate Review of Racist Summations: Redeeming the Promise of Searching Analysis, 11
MICH. J. RACE & L. 325, 346 (2006))); Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and
the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 59
(1996) (recalling how the “Southern myth of the ‘black-beast’ rapist justified lynching” in
the post-Reconstruction South).
105
Robert J. Smith & Zoë Robinson, Constitutional Liberty and the Progression of Punishment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 413, 425 (2017) (tracing the genesis of the “super-predators”
myth to a warning by Professor John DiIulio “of a coming ‘breed’ of juvenile offenders”
who are “fatherless, Godless, and jobless” and who “kill, rape, [and] maim, without giving it
a second thought”); Robert Mackey, 1996: Hillary Clinton on ‘Superpredators’, C-SPAN
(Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4582473/hillary-clinton-super-predators1996 [https://perma.cc/PA5D-V6MY] (video of then-First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton
warning of “the kinds of kids that are called super-predators. No conscience, no empathy.
We can talk about why they ended up that way, but first we have to bring them to heel.”).
106
L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2629–31 (2013) (summarizing science of implicit bias and the
widely-held implicit stereotype of “blacks as violent, hostile, aggressive and dangerous”);
Rachel D. Godsil & L. Song Richardson, Racial Anxiety, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2235, 2238–45
(2017) (connecting implicit racial bias to systemic “racial anxiety” in interracial interactions).
107
Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1080 (2006) (“[I]mplicit bias . . . is pervasive but
diffuse, consequential but unintended, ubiquitous but invisible.”); L. Song Richardson, Po-
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These racist tropes undergird not only the unjust targeting of innocent
Black people as criminals but work to deny genuine Black victims their status
as such. Empirical data overwhelmingly demonstrate that police, prosecutors,
judges, and juries are far less likely to believe the claims of Black victims than
White victims.108 This credibility discount in turn adversely affects those Black
victims who resort to lawful self-defense, who have their affirmative selfdefense claims rejected as much as ten times more frequently than similar
claims by White victims.109
Much of the “black criminality” myth has been directed at Black men, but
the unique rejection of claims by Black female victims of sexual and partner
abuse can inform the experience of the Black transgender community as well,
where significant overlap exists in the types of violence suffered. Black women
are physically and sexually assaulted by intimate partners at higher rates than
women of other races, but “cultural stereotypes and portrayals of the ‘angry’
and ‘independent’ Black woman have contributed to the perception that Black
girls and women need ‘less protection’ than other women, especially white
women.”110 This “myth of the angry and lascivious Black woman”111 delegitimizes her fear in the White normative mainstream because such a woman neither fits the model of the fragile and weak victim nor “needs” the protection of
society.
The Black female experience intersects with the Black transgender experience in another important way because both groups “have been depicted as
promiscuous and hypersexual.”112 Although both groups are subjected to sexual
violence at rates two to three times that of the national average, the “white
normative view that Black women are ‘less credible’ victims of rape, and other

lice Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1169 (2012) (“[I]mplicit biases
are ubiquitous, [but] they are also malleable.”).
108
See Rolnick, supra note 23, at 1654–55 (summarizing federal and private studies showing that Black criminal defendants are far less likely to successfully bring an affirmative selfdefense claim than their White criminal defendant counterparts); Tuerkheimer, supra note 47
at 5–6 (observing that the “credibility discount” is felt more severely among Black women
and other intersectional marginalized groups).
109
Rolnick, supra note 23, at 1654.
110
Ijoma, supra note 1, at 273 (quoting REBECCA EPSTEIN ET AL., GIRLS INTERRUPTED: THE
ERASURE OF BLACK GIRLS’ CHILDHOOD 8, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/poverty-inequali
ty-center/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/08/girlhood-interrupted.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ
D6-TLW6]).
111
Id. at 270.
112
Id. at 273 & n.115 (“explaining that ‘mainstream attitudes’ negated the victimization of
Black women who were raped and sexually assaulted because of ‘ruinous myths about
[B]lack women’s libidinous sexual proclivities’ ” (citing Kali Nicole Gross, African American Women, Mass Incarceration, and the Politics of Protection, 102 J. AM. HIST. 25, 26
(2015)).

21 NEV. L.J. 975

992

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:3

types of violence” permeates the criminal legal system.113 These views of Black
women as angry, hypersexual, and promiscuous also delegitimize their valid
claims of self-defense before a jury, which is less likely to see a victim lawfully
standing her ground to protect herself and more likely to see a violent, uncontrollable criminal lashing out in rage.
2. Transphobic Myths
In addition to the institutional distrust of Black people as inherently violent
and Black women as angry and hypersexual, official actors portray transgender
victims as “inherently deceitful and deceptive because of their inability to conform to socially constructed gender norms.”114 This myth adversely impacts
transgender victims’ interactions with police, who skeptically refuse to offer
protection.115 But it also works to deny them otherwise available affirmative
self-defense claims in criminal proceedings when transgender victims of violence protect themselves “because the prosecution—employing transphobic
language and traditional gender norms—successfully portrays them as untrustworthy.”116
This denial of affirmative self-defense protection exists particularly “[i]n
cases involving transgender people who kill in response to abuse or sexual assault.”117 Cisgender judges and juries often refuse or cannot “accept transgender
people as victims of gendered crimes” like rape or IPV, instead questioning the
legitimacy of such claims.118 The same skepticism greeting transgender men
and women as “bad victims” when reporting abuse to police also affects them
in the courtroom:
[s]ome judges are skeptical of gender-based claims of violence by transgender
litigants, insisting that because a transgender woman is not “biologically female”
in the traditional sense, the abuse must instead be mutual violence within a
same-sex relationship. Others have suggested that a claim of abuse is not credible because, by virtue of hir gender, the petitioner should be able to protect hirself.119

This reality confirms the underlying thesis of this Essay: transgender people, especially transgender people of color, are treated by the criminal legal system as if they are neither deserving of protection nor self-defense. Black
113

Id. at 274 (quoting Carolyn West, Black Women and Intimate Partner Violence: New Directions for Research, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1487, 1491 (2004)).
114
Id. at 283; see Goodmark, supra note 37, at 73.
115
Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 17.
116
Ijoma, supra note 1, at 284 (citing JOEY L. MOGUL ET AL., QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 71–75 (2011)).
117
Id. at 285.
118
Id.
119
Goodmark, supra note 37, at 89 (footnote omitted) (utilizing the gender-neutral pronouns
“hir” and “hirself” often preferred by transgender and nonbinary individuals).
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transgender victims are both excluded from state forms of legal protection and
yet punished under the same systems. Rather than providing a much-needed
pathway to self-protection, Stand Your Ground legislation is but an example of
this under-protective, over-punitive reality. Federal homicide data over a tenyear period revealed that “killings of Black people by White people were ruled
justified 35 [percent] of the time,” while “[k]illings of White people by Black
people were ruled justifiable in only 3 [percent] of cases.”120 Further, Black on
White homicides were the least likely of over a dozen demographic combinations to be deemed justified, while a study by the Marshall Project concluded
that “killings of Black men by White people . . . were eight times more likely to
be found justifiable than any other combination.”121
Similarly reliable data including the experience of transgender individuals
is scarce, but comparing the normative experiences of transgender victims and
defendants suggests similarly shocking treatment. Black transgender individuals like Ky Peterson are denied the ability even to raise a valid Stand Your
Ground defense in Georgia solely because of persistent transphobic attitudes
denying transgender individuals “victim” status.122 In contrast, dozens of (mostly White) men have successfully raised the so-called “trans panic” defense to
justify or mitigate the blame of killing a transgender individual, solely on the
theory that discovery of one’s transgender identity can reasonably compel angry, violent reaction, including murder.123
3. “The Perfect Victim”
The institutional denial of victimhood to Black transgender individuals
communicates a societal judgment that people who behave in gender nonconforming or gender nonbinary ways are less deserving of protection from violence—especially sexual violence—because they engage in behavior of which
we disapprove. Sexual assault advocates are familiar with these gender normative judgments, wherein burdens are placed on the (female) victim to prevent
being raped by the (male) perpetrator. Women ought to take simple safety precautions (that men do not have to take), make smarter decisions (expending
mental energy not required of men), or not put themselves “in the wrong place

120

Rolnick, supra note 23, at 1654.
Id. at 1654–55.
122
See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
123
See Lee, supra note 48, at 1411 (“The trans panic defense is not a traditional criminal law
defense. . . . Rather, trans panic is a defense strategy associated with the provocation or heat
of passion defense. A murder defendant . . . will claim that the discovery that the victim was
a transgender female . . . provoked him into a heat of passion, causing him to lose his selfcontrol.”); id. at 1428 n.108 (summarizing successful gay and trans panic defenses).
121
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at the wrong time” (places and times that are not off limits to men). In short,
women ought to work diligently not to get raped.124
This type of victim-blaming mentality derives from the myth of the “perfect victim,”125 the pure, virginal, modest, White woman who did nothing to
provoke or invite her attack, and who is thus morally blameless.126 Despite the
#MeToo Movement’s attempts to direct attention to the nuances of sexual assault, and particularly the nuances of victim responses in vulnerable, coercive
settings, society still identifies “the image of the ‘victim’ . . . [as] a blameless,
pure stereotype, with whom all can identify.”127 A “victim” is “an elderly person robbed of her life savings, an ‘innocent bystander’ injured or killed during
a holdup, or a brutally ravaged rape victim. ‘Victims’ are not prostitutes beaten
senseless . . . drug addicts mugged and robbed . . . or misdemeanants raped by
cellmates.”128
These gender normative, sexist, racist moral purity tests simply leave no
room for a Black transgender victim of (sexual) violence. They institutionalize
and reinforce that an already marginalized population is simply less deserving
of society’s protection because of its perceived moral inferiority. Indeed, the
“perfect victim” fallacy to which Black transgender victims are subjected represents a core dehumanization beyond the behavior-based shaming of most rape
124

See, e.g., Charlotte Hilton Andersen, How to Teach Girls How Not to Get Raped, GREAT
FITNESS EXPERIMENT (Jan. 10, 2013, 10:15 AM), http://www.thegreatfitnessexperiment.com/
2013/01/how-to-teach-girls-how-not-to-get-raped.html [https://web.archive.org/web/201301
16230352/http://www.thegreatfitnessexperiment.com/2013/01/how-to-teach-girls-how-notto-get-raped.html] (describing a self-defense class in which the teacher told young girls to
report any attempted assault or rape “[b]ecause if you don’t report it – what if your best
friend comes walking along that same path [two] weeks later and gets raped? If you don’t
report it then it’s your fault if other girls get hurt,” and offering suggestions for teaching prevention of sexual assault in ways that would not shift responsibility to victims); KATIE
ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 9 (1993) (describing
the first week of college for a female student, where “there are fliers and counselors and videotapes telling us how not to get AIDS and how not to get raped, where not to wander and
what signals not to send”).
125
This use of the phrase “perfect victim” does not refer to the mythical “perfect rape victim,” who responds to unwanted sexual advances in the manner preferred by judges and juries—by screaming, offering forcible physical and verbal resistance, and by immediately
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victims. Rather than critiquing the actions of this community as risky and
blameworthy, this trope attacks the very personhood of the victim, critiquing
the racial and gender identity central to their existence.
CONCLUSION
The experience of Black transgender people in the criminal legal system
reflects a “legac[y] of an exclusionary politics of protection,” wherein they are
not entitled to the law’s protection when they need it most but instead unjustly
face its punishment by virtue of their existence.129 This vulnerable intersectional community experiences criminal violence at rates far in excess of the national average, yet their attempts to seek state protection result in a dangerous mixture of ambivalence, discrimination, and state-sanctioned violence.
Faced with this reality, the Black transgender community desperately needs
access to the law’s recognition of protective self-defense. Legislative expansions of core self-defense doctrine, problematic as they are for many marginalized communities, should represent an opportunity for this community to exercise lawful self-help measures as a last (and often only) resort. Unfortunately,
this exclusionary politics of protection not only excludes Black transgender
violence victims from police protection but from legal self-protection when
they stand their ground and fight back against their assailants. This Essay highlights the dual problems of under-protection and over-punishment. The solutions—more equitable, just, and compassionate treatment of Black transgender
victims of crime—seem obvious. While this Essay does not attempt to sketch
out an infrastructure for reform, hopefully shining a light on the problem can
inform the urgent conversations to come.
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